Filed under: Middle East News
Most of you probably have an idea of what’s going on in Iran right now–the presidential election results are out, and show Mahmoud Ahmadinejad winning with a suspiciously (i.e. ludicrously) high 62% of the votes compared to challenger Mir Hussein Moussavi’s 38%. Over 70% of the population voted, which is pretty insane. You can read some up-to-date analyzes here and here, but you get the idea. It’s pretty definite that Ahmadinejad didn’t fairly garner that many, and people are very, very upset about it in Iran. There’s some pretty hardcore and widespread rioting going on, with the anticipated authoritarian crackdown subsequently shutting down text messaging, universities, and much internet access. Several prominent opposition politicians appear to have been arrested or have “disappeared.” I don’t believe any casualties have been reported yet, but at this point it seems like a matter of time. A friend of mine posted this blog link from an Iranian writer. Skip the short paragraph and scroll down to the photographs–they are amazing. This is something you don’t want to miss. Here are a few samples, but I highly recommend you click the link and see them all. This is going down in Tehran right now.
Much to the surprise of just about everyone, March 14th swept the Lebanese elections on Sunday. Not only did they win, they did so by a pretty healthy majority–71 seats to March 8th’s 58.
So….what happened?
There are a few main points. The first is the significance of the Christian vote, which was split between the two coalitions. Sunnis largely fall into the March 14th bloc and Shiites into March 8th, so that leaves Christians as the deciders. In this election, they decided to side with the current majority party. General Aoun is generally seen as the loser here, who let down his allies by not pulling his weight with the Christians. Interestingly, it seems that his candidates did well in garnering Muslim votes, which I think says something about the strength of his alliance with Hezbollah and Amal.
The second main question right now is how much Hezbollah really wanted to win the election. In a fairly insightful political analysis, longtime commentator Paul Salem argues that it is in the party’s best interests to remain a resistance organization with representation in the government, rather than the leading coalition. Despite everyone’s predictions for the outcome of this election, he’s probably right–Hezbollah didn’t field very many candidates, probably because it didn’t want to gain too much power and lose their “opposition” status. It’s disappointing, as the majority bloc has largely failed to provide for the citizens and it’s possible that Hezbollah could, but they aren’t willing to take the plunge and become responsible for the well-being of the nation. Also, Thomas Friedman wrote a fairly strongly-worded article that I’m not sure I entirely agreed with. He seems heavily, heavily pro-democracy/West/March 14th in this column, but I feel like if Hezbollah had won he would have supported that too on the grounds of legitimate, fair elections and a general sense of anti-Israeli-ness.
I’m in Athens now (more on that later), so it’s hard to say what the mood is like in Beirut. There was a lot of March 14th celebration, but everything seemed pretty calm and peaceful as I was leaving. March 8th has accepted the results as legitimate (well, as legitimate as any Lebanese election ever is), and it seems like things are progressing forward. I don’t have many details at the moment because I’m too busy to research (I’m in Greece right now, give me a break), but I definitely recommend people keep an eye on things. The main thing to watch for is the likelihood of a unity government that includes Hezbollah, the status of that party’s veto power, and who the Prime Minister will be. I’m very curious to see how this all turns out. I’m proud of the Lebanese for remaning calm during the election, as there were very few and relatively minor security issues. I hope that their decision was the right one.
So, I’m down to less than 32 hours in Beirut, and it’s a time of a bit of reflection on changes.
First off, the election has been going on today. It’s 9 pm local time, and the polls closed an hour ago. I’ve been following updates on Ya Libnan in all of their poorly constructed, confusing, and unhelpful glory. Seems like there have been several minor clashes all over the country, including in Beirut, but very much nothing worth noting. This is common–a few kids with sticks beat up a few other kids with sticks wearing the wrong color of t-shirt, until the army breaks it up and arrests people as appropriate. There are 50,000 police and army officers on duty at this moment, and they’re keeping everything locked down pretty tight. No security concerns to warrant. I haven’t been out of the house because I’m furiously working on my last paper, but apparently the streets are pretty empty–in Lebanon, everyone is registered to vote in their “home village” were their family is from, which means that a huge percentage of Beirutis have left town to go back to vote. Unofficial results should be coming in around midnight, with official results as early as tomorrow afternoon. It’ll be interesting to see how it all pans out.
Second, I have to be at the airport at 2 am Tuesday morning, which is coming up alarmingly quickly. I’m less worried about the paper (I’ve written more than 3500 words so far, and I can work on it while I travel and email it in), and more just worried about leaving. I like it here, and I’m sad to go. As much as I’m feeling a bit homesick and definitely looking forward to the next three weeks of traveling around solo (Ramy, my roommate from back in the states, decided to not come with after all), I’m not entirely sure that I’m ready to leave Beirut. Alex extended for another semester, Hamza and Sirvydas are staying until July, others are here for their full degrees. I’m the first to leave, and that kind of sucks. Fortunately, I had a bit of a send-off on Friday night at my friend Xriss’ family house up in the mountains (pictures to follow at some point). They have a place in a village called Yachousch, which is a gorgeous Christian area. The house was big and well-stocked, and it was a big, fun group of people. The next day, we lounged around on their lawn (real grass! ahhhh!) and sat in a jacuzzi full of sun-warmed water and played ping-pong. It was hard to convince myself to leave, as the party was going on for a second night, but I caught a ride back to Beirut with Xriss’ boyfriend so I could work on my Conflict and Conflict Management paper. There’s an election party tonight that I’ll make an appearance at to say goodbye to everyone, and then tomorrow will be spent cleaning my apartment and rushing around tying up loose ends and saying goodbye to other people. And then *poof!*–I’m gone.
I don’t really know what else to say about this place, before I get home. I know that I’ve had a really good semester, and I definitely plan to come back to Lebanon in the future. I’m at the point in my educational career where it’s time to start thinking about potential graduate school ideas. I don’t think that I’d choose to go to AUB for that, but there’s always a possibility of fellowships or doing research abroad. If that doesn’t pan out, I can always come back here on vacation or possibly for employment in the future. Who knows? I’m definitely not done here, though.
As for AUB as a school–well, it’s had its ups and downs. I know that I would recommend the experience of studying abroad here, though I have mixed feelings about the university itself. My classes have certainly been interesting and given me new perspectives on a lot of things, including some fantastic debates, though the standard of quality of the professors at times was a little bit lower than I’d have liked. Regardless of the quality of the education, though, it’s been an amazing few months and I hope one hell of a resumé builder. I’m also hoping to use some of my professors here as references for future opportunities. In other words, this has definitely been a worthwhile investment for me.
Not much to add at this point. I expect that I’ll do some decompression when I get back to the US, and post more extensively about my thoughts of this experience. Before that, I’ll try to provide some updates here while I’m on the road. Until then, cheers.
This is a two-part program put on by Al Jazeera English that’s a week or so old, but somehow I didn’t manage to notice it until now. Interviewers went to Hamra Street, half a block away from my apartment, to ask Lebanese people a series of questions regarding politics, religion, Middle Eastern affairs, and pop culture stuff. Of course, the answers that they chose to show represent a lot of opposing viewpoints. I don’t think that the program really proves much, other than that division exists in the country–shocker! Still, though, it’s interesting to see what questions were deemend important enough to ask and how different people answered. Also, a lot of the interviewees are AUB students, on campus. And kind of gorgeous. I’m just sayin’.
*Sidenote: my friend Alex finds Lebanese blondes to be more attractive in general than the brunettes. I’d like to file these videos as “Exhibit A” of why he’s an idiot and I’m right.
Filed under: Middle East News
I am unabashedly pro-Palestinian. My convictions are strong, supported by years of close reading of all information I can find on the issue. I’ve learned a lot about refugees while in Lebanon, and every day I continue to read the news and hear new stories about how the Israeli government continues to destroy the lives of Palestinians, through direct action or tacit support of actions taken by “extremist settlers.”
Thus, I support Palestinian resistance in a myriad of forms. Of course, nonviolent protest is the preferable method. I think that any rational human being understands that when a problem can be resolved without causing pain, suffering, or psychological trauma, it should be done in that way. I believe that it should never be the policy of any individual, organization, or state to commit to violent means as a first response, while other options still exist. However, there are times when I see violence as the only recourse left for the Palestinians, the only way to really make themselves heard. The Al Aqsa Intifada is a good example of this, in my opinion. To be honest, I have severe doubts that the conflict can ever be resolved without some sort of ugliness, be it diplomatic or militant, and I predict it will be militant. The current system is not sustainable, and no one is backing down–indeed, both sides are becoming more extreme. With that in mind, violence seems inevitable, and if the Palestinians are to secure the homeland that I believe they deserve, they will have to be party to it. They will never be stronger than the IDF, but I think if they are going to be recognized then they will need to hit hard. Of course, tactics should enter into the consideration of what is considered “legitimate” or “illegitimate” violence–the intentional targeting of civilians by both sides in the ongoing conflict is a travesty, and something that I don’t support. Still, though, I can sympathize with a frustrated population living under military occupation, with a growing population but extremely limited income and employment opportunities, with education medical services, and basic supplies sorely lacking and the inability to freely move within their own homeland because they are classified, as a race, to be “militant.” I don’t know that I could survive in those conditions, and I am continually amazed by the strength of the Palestinian people.
Unfortunately, some Palestinians go too far. There are limits to my support of those who use violence as a form of protest regarding not only tactics, but their goals as well. A friend of mine at AUB posted a short video on her Facebook page from an organization called “Never Before.” I looked around a little bit and found some other videos, which are all fairly professionally done and visually stimulating, but many of which were quite alarming.
Set to the soundtrack of, I kid you not, the movie “300,” the implications at the conclusion of this video disturb me to the extreme. If the oppressors are to be judged like “never before,” that essentially says that retribution will be worse than the Holocaust.
The second to last frame of this video, “I call it Palestine,” essentially claims that the nation is by nature militant, and will not be anything else. What a hopeless cause, when Palestine is best symbolized by an M16 rather than an outline of the homeland, an image of al-Aqsa or the Dome of the Rock, or an olive tree.
No quarter–that is essentially what this clip advocates. There will be no negotiation with the occupiers, period. Victory is the only option, and it won’t be done in a diplomatic way. This is about revenge, bordering on extermination.
This is a Palestine that I do not support.
A few stories going on right now that I want to call attention to. Bear with me, they’re both pretty important.
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German newspaper Der Spiegel printed an article two days ago claiming that it had obtained leaked information on the Hariri tribunal, and that the verdict was more or less in–Hezbollah was responsible.
Hold the phone.
Hezbollah? The party that, as I mentioned a week ago, stands to gain so much in the next election? And this damning information happens to come out less than two weeks before that very same election? I’m not much for conspiracy theories, but I am heavily dubious of Spiegel’s claim. Read the story at the above link, and then consider these points:
1. Logic The article makes the claim that Hezbollah “gained” from Hariri’s assassination, somehow brushing off the fact that it led to a massive anti-Syrian, pro-Western surge in the country by tying it to Hezbollah’s kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers the next year, leading to the party’s victory in the 2006 July War. There is no correlation between the two incidents, though. Hassan Nasrallah suffered greatly in the aftermath of the former Prime Minister’s killing as Saad Hariri swept to become the most popular person in Lebanon. The Syrians, Nasrallah’s closest allies, were forced to withdraw. The West became more involved. Then, a year and a half later, Hezbollah started a war. Afterward, Nasrallah admitted that Hezbollah would not have kidnapped the soldiers if they had known it would lead to so much destruction. This wasn’t a masterminded plan, no matter how much Der Spiegel tries to associate the two events to each other. Nasrallah would have been far, far better off if Hariri was still in power during the July War, and Hezbollah had proven itself stronger than the government by winning.
2. Style of the article Spiegel’s article reads like sensationalist journalism. It speaks romantically of the whole background story, providing far too much detail in the wrong places. It gives a great deal of unnecessary history, and excepting the title and subtitle, doesn’t get to the point until the 9th paragraph. In the subtitle, it emphasizes more that the information is being kept secret (duh, that’s the way investigations are required by international law to work–private investigation, public trial) than that Hezbollah was the guilty party. This doesn’t read like breaking news, which it certainly would be if the information was certified to be true–it reads like a tabloid. At a few points, there are contradictions: the article first claims to have “sources close to the tribunal” that provided the information, but then later speaks of “Spiegel’s source.” There are also large sections that are admittedly built on “speculation.”
3. Timing Isn’t it suspicious that this article came out perfectly in time to greatly influence the election? Even Haaretz, an Israeli paper, admitted that this was a little bit too convenient:
It is possible that the UN investigator examining the Hariri assassination received new information refuting earlier intelligence estimates that the murder was the work of the Syrian regime and Lebanese intelligence officials linked to it. The timing of the report, however, gives the impression that it was released more to alter election results than to bring the truth to light.
I’m personally inclined to agree. There is a lot at stake in this election, and I wouldn’t put it past anyone from meddling. There’s a long who’s-who list of individuals, nations, and organizations that would love to see March 14th perform better than anticipated in the election–first on the list being the US government. Hell, Spiegel even admits that the timing seems fishy:
One can only speculate over the reasons why the Hariri tribunal is holding back its new information about the assassination. Perhaps the investigators in the Netherlands fear that it could stir up the situation in Lebanon. On Friday evening, the press office in Leidschendam responded tersely to a written inquiry from SPIEGEL, noting that it could not comment on “operational details.”
Perhaps, indeed. Maybe we should speculate a little bit more before printing articles.
Now, perhaps I’m wrong. Perhaps I’m so anti-Zionist (and thus so anti-current Israeli administration) that I’m biased towards trusting an organization that has indeed been responsible for many assassinations and kidnappings in the past. But I feel like it’s telling that Spiegel reported on it, and no one else did. Despite the wide coverage that the Hariri tribunal has garnered around the world, you won’t find any mention of this new evidence, or even a story about the story of the evidence, in the New York Times or BBC. The Israeli papers are, of course, going crazy right now. Al Jazeera posted a short article, which quickly got buried. The majority of the buzz around this story has been centered on those most affected, and the bloggers who pay attention. Many of them are likewise suspicious of this story. It’ll be a while before we find out for sure, but this is a pretty big deal and could have a large impact on the elections. I’ll keep you posted if more information comes up.
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The second issue I wanted to bring up is a story that has gotten far too little media coverage, so I thought I’d spread it around as much as possible. It came to my attention a few days ago when I saw it here, on my friend Nicolien’s blog.
From Haaretz, on May 15th:
Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s party wants to ban Israeli Arabs from marking the anniversary of what they term “the Catastrophe” or Nakba, when in 1948 some 700,000 Arabs lost their homes in the war that led to the establishment of the state of Israel.
The ultranationalist Yisrael Beitenu party said it would propose legislation next week for a ban on the practice and a jail term of up to three years for violators.
“The draft law is intended to strengthen unity in the state of Israel and to ban marking Independence Day as a day of mourning,” said party spokesman Tal Nahum.
The initiative could fuel racial tensions stoked by Lieberman’s February election campaign call to make voting or the holding of public office in Israel contingent on pledging loyalty to the Jewish state.
If that isn’t a racist policy, I don’t know what is. “Palestinians in Israel” (what Arab-Israelis generally refer to themselves as) make up 20% of the population of a nation that guarantees equal rights to all citizens, regardless of race or religion. May 15th is usually the date of commemoration for al-Nakba, though this year it was held on the 14th because the 15th was a Friday. Lieberman’s proposal has gotten remarkably little coverage in Western papers. I did find mention of it in Al Jazeera, but not in its own article–rather in a separate one about how Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu stated that he wouldn’t stop settlements from expanding, and was instead going to keep dismantling a few infinitesimally small “illegal outposts” that aren’t approved by the government, while allowing the much larger and more destructive ones to continue on their own path. The UN has declared all Israeli settlements in the West Bank to be illegal under international law.
Al-Nakba is an incredibly important historical event in the Palestinian consciousness. It had a massive impact not only within Palestine, but also on the neighboring countries that suddenly took on hundreds of thousands of poor refugees that had been evicted from their land. It is a truly tragic story, and I personally am disgusted by Lieberman’s gall at blatantly trying to make the Palestinians forget their roots. That is something that cannot, and I think will not, ever happen. This excellent site has a huge amount of information about al-Nakba and Palestine before 1948, I definitely recommend browsing around–it’s not only Palestinians that should remember what happened. I’d like to further shamelessly steal from Nicolien’s blog by posting this picture that she shared. Red is Palestinian territory, grey is Israeli.
EDIT: Fortunately, coverage of this story is increasing. For more information, the BBC put up a pretty good article this evening.
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On a mostly unrelated note, I should point out that today in Lebanon is “Liberation Day”–commemorating when the Israeli occupation of Lebanon ended in 2000. IDF troops were stationed in the southern part of the country for 18 years, ten of which were after the Civil War ended, until the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army collapsed and Israel was left truly alone. The rapid and chaotic withdrawl was messy and widely regarded as a Hezbollah political victory, as the Israelis were seen turning tail and running, many of their Lebanese allies (considered traitors by the government, citizens, and the Party of God) attempting to cross the border and seek asylum in Israel.
